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Abstract
This paper analyzes global dynamics in a macroeconomic model where both monetary and fis-
cal policies are nonlinear, consistent with empirical evidence. Nonlinear monetary policy, in
which the nominal interest rate features an increasing marginal reaction to inflation, interacting
with nonlinear fiscal policy, in which the primary budget surplus features an increasing marginal
reaction to debt, gives rise to four steady-state equilibria. Each steady state exhibits in its
neighborhood a pair of ‘active’/‘passive’ monetary/fiscal policies a` la Leeper-Woodford, and is
typically investigated in isolation within linearized monetary models. We show that, when global
nonlinear dynamics are taken into account, such steady states are endogenously connected. In
particular, the global dynamics reveals the existence of infinite self-fulfilling paths that originate
around the steady states locally displaying either monetary or fiscal ‘dominance’—and thus lo-
cally delivering equilibrium determinacy—as well as around the unstable steady state with active
monetary-fiscal policies, and that converge into an unintended high-debt/low-inflation (possibly
deflation) attractor. Such global trajectories—bounded by two heteroclinic orbits connecting
the three out-of-the-trap steady states—are, however, obscured if the four monetary-fiscal policy
mixes are studied locally and disjointly.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the interactions between monetary and fiscal
policies from a nonlinear perspective. We hinge on fairly well-established empirical
evidence showing the occurrence of nonlinear policy behavior in reaction to inflation
and public debt. Central banks, on the one hand, tend to strengthen the adoption of
corrective measures as inflation departs from the target through an increasing marginal
response of nominal interest rates to upward pressures in inflation.1 Reasons such as
the zero lower bound problem on nominal interest rates (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe, 2001), the loss in credibility as inflation rises (Neuenkirch and Tillmann, 2014),
and the scope for asymmetric preferences (Cukierman and Muscatelli, 2008) are often
advocated to explain the recourse to nonlinear ‘Taylor rules’. Governments, on the
other hand, tend to strengthen the adoption of corrective measures as fiscal imbalances
deteriorate through an increasing marginal response of primary budget surpluses to
the accumulation of debt.2 Political-economy reasons such as political polarization,
conflicting distributional objectives between different socioeconomic groups in relation
to the burden of budgetary retrenchment, and political stalemate over the distribution
of fiscal adjustments (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Bertola and Drazen, 1993) are often
advanced to explain the occurrence of postponed fiscal actions. The overall consequences
for macroeconomic dynamics are widely unexplored. The present study is an effort to
fill this gap.
We show that such nonlinearities in both monetary and fiscal policy actions enhance
the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria and, as a consequence, fundamentally affect
the implied dynamic interrelationships among macroeconomic policies. We demonstrate,
specifically, that nonlinear monetary policy interacting with nonlinear fiscal policy nec-
essarily gives rise to four steady-state equilibria.3 Each steady state exhibits in its
neighborhood a pair of ‘active’/‘passive’ monetary/fiscal policies a` la Leeper-Woodford
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(see, e.g., Leeper, 1991, Woodford, 2003, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba, 2011, and Leeper
and Leith, 2016).4 We prove that the steady states are endogenously connected from
a global-dynamics perspective. In particular, there exists an infinite number of self-
fulfilling paths originating around the steady states locally featured by either monetary
or fiscal ‘dominance’ (Leeper and Leith, 2016)—and so locally featured by equilibrium
determinacy associated to saddle-path stability—as well as around the unstable steady
state with active monetary-fiscal policies, and globally spiraling into an unintended high-
debt/low-inflation (possibly deflation) trap.
We find that the implied basin of attraction characterized by debt increases and
disinflation turns to be bounded by two heteroclinic orbits connecting the three out-of-
the-trap steady states. We demonstrate, in particular, that such heteroclinic orbits are
generated by the saddle manifolds associated to the steady state with active monetary
and passive fiscal policy, and to the steady state with passive monetary and active fiscal
policy, respectively.
The foregoing global dynamic properties are obscured if one studies the overall four
monetary-fiscal policy mixes locally and disjointly, as in the standard literature. Once
nonlinearities compatible with empirical evidence are taken into account, on the other
hand, it emerges that neither monetary dominance nor fiscal dominance can prevail as
an equilibrium outcome. The existence of debt-disinflation attracting traps renders the
equilibrium system globally indeterminate and the policy makers unable to ‘pin down’
the inflation rate.
In other words, the local determinacy results typically obtained under linear mone-
tary and fiscal feedback rules disappear as soon as the two policy regimes turn to be glob-
ally affected by nonlinearities. From this perspective, the theoretical findings elucidated
in this paper provide analytical foundations for the view that incorporating nonlinear
policy behaviors into macroeconomic models might be essential for a general character-
ization of macroeconomics dynamics under monetary and fiscal state-contingent rules,
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reacting to the current fundamentals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the paper’s connections with
the literature. Section 3 develops the dynamic model with nonlinear monetary and
fiscal rules. Section 4 analyzes the steady states. Section 5 analyzes local and global
dynamics, and establishes the main results. Section 6 discusses the implications of the
main theoretical findings. Section 7 addresses the issue of results’ robustness in the
context of extended versions of our model. Section 8 summarizes the main conclusions
and outlines possible directions for further theoretical work.
2 Related Literature and Model Choice
The present study is related to different strands of empirical and theoretical macroe-
conomic research. First, the paper is connected to the literature that documents the
fact that central bank policy behavior can empirically be described by nonlinear feed-
back interest rate rules of Taylor’s (1993) style. According to this hypothesis, monetary
policy rules are characterized by an increasing marginal reaction of nominal short-term
interest rates to upward deviations of inflation from the target. Dolado, Maria-Dolores
and Ruge-Murcia (2004) find that the U.S. monetary policy regime after 1983 can be
represented in terms of nonlinear Taylor rule due to the presence of asymmetric pref-
erences, in the sense that, for a given magnitude, positive inflation deviations from the
target are weighted more heavily than negative deviations. These findings are remark-
ably confirmed by the studies of Petersen (2007), Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008,) and
Lee and Son (2013), in contrast with the linearity results originally due to Clarida, Gal´ı
and Gertler (2000). Analogous nonlinear monetary regimes are shown to have been ro-
bustly operative in the U.K. after the introduction of an inflation-targeting framework
in 1992 (Martin and Milas, 2004; Taylor and Davradakis, 2006; Cukierman and Mus-
catelli, 2008; Castro, 2011), in several European countries—such as Germany, France and
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Spain—before the introduction of the euro in 1999 (Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira,
2000, 2005), and subsequently in the European Monetary Union (Dolado, Maria-Dolores
and Naveira, 2005; Castro 2011; Kulikauskas, 2014). Monetary policy is further shown to
have become systematically tighter as inflation rises in emerging Asian and Latin Amer-
ican countries (Miles and Schreyer, 2012, 2014; Ma, 2016; Shen, Lin and Guo, 2016).
Beyond the occurrence of asymmetries in central banks preferences, further possible rea-
sons advanced in the literature to justify the case for adopting a nonlinear monetary
regime include the zero lower bound problem on nominal interest rates, emphasized in
the seminal study of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001) about the plausibility
of liquidity traps induced by Taylor-type rules, and the loss in central bank credibility
as inflation increases, pointed out by Neuenkirch and Tillmann (2014).
Second, the paper is linked to the literature that finds that governments’ policy be-
havior can be empirically characterized by nonlinear formulations of the primary-surplus
feedback policy rules of the type originally proposed by Leeper (1991). The seminal work
by Bohn (1998) shows that the U.S. historical primary budget surplus since 1916 can be
described as a nonlinearly increasing function of debt. Additional evidence on nonlin-
ear fiscal adjustments over the U.S. fiscal history is provided by Sarno (2001), Arestis,
Cipollini and Fattouh (2004), and Cipollini, Fattouh and Mouratidis (2009). Such a
type of ‘delayed’ budgetary policy measures when debt tends to accumulate overtime is
also detected for the historical fiscal record in the U.K since 1919 (Considine and Gal-
lagher, 2008; Arghyrou and Fan, 2013) and for European countries historically subject
to fiscal imbalances—such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece (Bajo-Rubio,
Diaz-Roldan and Esteve, 2004, 2006; Arghyrou and Luintel, 2007; Legrenzi and Mi-
las, 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Piergallini and Postigliola, 2013). Postponed corrective actions
in the conduct of fiscal policy are further shown to have occurred in Latin American
and Caribbean countries (Chortareas, Kapetanios and Uctum, 2008). Remarkably, it is
possible to identify several theoretical reasons for fiscal stabilization postponement. In
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particular, according to Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Bertola and Drazen (1993), the
presence of political polarization, conflicting distributional objectives among different
socioeconomic groups with respect to the burden of fiscal retrenchment, and political
stalemate over how the burden of higher taxes or expenditure cuts should be allocated
are likely to dampen the application of timely budgetary adjustments, up to a certain
‘trigger point’ at which a sufficiently pronounced consolidated fiscal action typically
arises in order to rule out the widespread costs of a debt crisis.
Overall, our study is related to evolutionary macroeconomic modelling under at
least three important dimensions emphasized by Nelson and Winter (1982), Radzicki
and Sterman (1994), and Dosi and Nelson (1994), among others. First, our model
examines the consequences of non-linear, non-optimal—in Ramsey’s (1928) sense—rule-
guided feedback behavior by policy makers, which is shown to cause endogenous shifts in
both monetary and fiscal regimes. Such regimes are, on the other hand, typically stud-
ied locally and ‘in isolation’ by the standard literature (e.g., Leeper, 1991; Woodford,
2003). The approach developed in this paper is thus along the lines of the evolution-
ary macroeconomic model recently elaborated by Agliari, Naimzada and Pecora (2017),
which is, however, entirely focused on the dynamic implications of nonlinear monetary
policy rules. Second, the nonlinear rule-guided policy behavior gives rise to a nonlinear
economic system that exhibits multiple equilibria. Remarkably, according to Dosi and
Nelson (1994), ‘behavior and achievement differ greatly across the possible equilibria’.
Third, the global-dynamics analysis here performed shows the possible occurrence of
off-target self-fulfilling patterns, leading to unintended outcomes, such as endogenous
debt-deflation spirals. The presence of such unintended attractors per se prevents the
economy from achieving globally welfare-maximizing equilibria. As a result, in view
of the distinguishing features of the present setup—the occurrence of ‘routines’ (Nel-
son and Winter, 1982) in the monetary-fiscal policy setting, the emergence of multiple
fixed points, and the existence of multiple off-target trajectories bringing about endoge-
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nous structural changes in macroeconomic policy regimes—our contribution attempts to
provide an evolutionary interpretation of monetary-fiscal interactions.
3 The Model
We set forth a continuous-time macroeconomic environment a` la Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2001) in order to show how a nonlinear monetary policy stance
combined with a nonlinear fiscal policy stance can easily amplify the multiplicity of
steady-state equilibria.
Consider an economy populated by a large number of identical infinitely lived house-
holds deriving utility from consumption and real money holdings. The lifetime utility
function of the representative household is given by
∫
∞
0
e−rtu(c (t) ,m (t))dt, (1)
where r > 0 indicates the rate of time preference, c (t) consumption, and m (t) real
money balances at instant of time t. The utility function u (· , ·) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in both arguments. According to Reis (2007), consumption and real
balances are Edgeworth complements, implying ucm > 0. The representative household’s
instant budget constraint is given by
a˙ (t) = (R (t)− pi (t)) a (t)−R (t)m (t) + y (t)− c (t)− τ (t) , (2)
where a (t) indicates real financial wealth, consisting of interest-bearing government
bonds and money balances, y (t) an endowment of perishable goods, τ (t) lump-sum
taxes net of public transfers, R (t) the nominal interest rate on bonds, and pi (t) the in-
flation rate. Households are subject to the borrowing limit condition precluding Ponzi’s
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games, given by
lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
[R(x)−pi(x)]dxa (t) ≥ 0. (3)
Thus, at optimum,
uc(c (t) ,m (t)) = λ (t) , (4)
um(c (t) ,m (t)) = λ (t)R (t) , (5)
λ˙ (t) = λ (t) (r + pi (t)−R (t)) , (6)
lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
[R(x)−pi(x)]dxa (t) = 0, (7)
where λ (t) is the costate variable associated with the flow budget constraint.
Consider now the public sector. Consistently with Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2001) and the empirical literature discussed in the previous section, we assume
that the monetary authority adopts an interest rate policy described by a nonlinear
feedback rule of the form
R (t) = Φ(pi (t)), (8)
where function Φ (·) is continuous, strictly positive,5 and obeys Φ′ (·) ,Φ′′ (·) > 0.
The government’s instant budget constraint is given by
a˙ (t) = (R (t)− pi (t)) a (t)− s (t) , (9)
where s (t) = τ (t) +R (t)m (t) denotes the primary surplus inclusive of interest savings
from the issuance of money.6 Differently from the typical literature on monetary theory
and policy, we consider the case in which not only the monetary policy stance, but also
the fiscal policy stance followed by the government, displays nonlinearities. In particular,
in order to capture the postponed fiscal adjustments detected empirically, the fiscal
authority adjusts the primary surplus according to a non-linear feedback policy of the
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form
s (t) = Ω(a (t)), (10)
where function Ω (·) is continuous, strictly positive,7 and obeys Ω′ (·) ,Ω′′ (·) > 0.
Equilibrium in the goods market requires c (t) = y (t). Assume that the endowment
is constant over time, that is, y (t) = y for each t ∈ [0,∞), without loss of generality.
Thus, from equations (4) and (5), it emerges that
λ (t) = L (R (t)) , (11)
with L′ (·) = uc/ (umm/ucm − um/uc) < 0. Combining (6), (8) and (11), equilibrium
dynamics of inflation follow
p˙i (t) = −
L (Φ(pi (t)))
Φ′(pi (t))L′(Φ(pi (t)))
(Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)− r) . (12)
Substituting (10) and (8) into (9), equilibrium dynamics of government liabilities follow
a˙ (t) = (Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)) a (t)−Ω(a (t)). (13)
4 Steady States and Active-Passive Monetary-Fiscal Poli-
cies
In this section, we develop the steady-state analysis and investigate the related properties
in terms of monetary-fiscal policy regimes. In particular, the next proposition applies.
Proposition 1 (Steady-State Analysis.) Suppose that both monetary and fiscal policies
are nonlinear (Φ′,Φ′′,Ω′,Ω′′ > 0). Then, from the equilibrium system (12)-(13), there
exist four steady states, (a¯, p¯i), (aˆ, p¯i), (a¯, pˆi), and (aˆ, pˆi), satisfying a¯ < aˆ and p¯i < pˆi.
Moreover, (a) at (a¯, p¯i) monetary policy is passive and fiscal policy is active, (b) at (aˆ, p¯i)
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monetary and fiscal policies are both passive, (c) at (a¯, pˆi) monetary and fiscal policies
are both active, and (d) at (aˆ, pˆi) monetary policy is active and fiscal policy is passive.
Proof. Setting p˙i (t) = 0 in (12) yields the Fisher equation, Φ(pi) = r + pi. Because the
monetary policy reaction function Φ (·) is strictly positive and satisfies Φ′ (·) ,Φ′′ (·) > 0,
such a steady-state relation has two solutions, p¯i and pˆi. Figure 1 shows the two steady-
state equilibria for the inflation rate, which occur at the intersections of functions Φ (pi)
and r + pi. Suppose that pˆi > 0 is the target inflation rate. Following Taylor (1993) and
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001), assume also that, at the target inflation rate,
monetary policy is ‘active’, that is, Φ′ (pˆi) > 1. According to this requirement, monetary
authorities overreact to upward deviations of inflation from the target by increasing
the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one with respect to an increase in the
inflation rate. Then, the alternative steady-state value p¯i < pˆi must feature a relatively
low—possibly negative—inflation rate. In addition, in the neighborhood of p¯i, monetary
policy is necessarily ‘passive’, Φ′ (p¯i) < 1. Setting now a˙ (t) = 0 in (13) yields Ω (a) =
ra. Because the fiscal policy reaction function Ω (·) is strictly positive and satisfies
Ω′ (·) ,Ω′′ (·), this steady-state relation has two solutions, a¯, aˆ > 0. Figure 2 shows the
two steady-state equilibria for government liabilities, which occur at the intersections of
functions Ω′(a) and ra. We have set a¯ < aˆ, which must imply Ω′ (a¯) < r and Ω′ (aˆ) > r.
As a consequence, applying Leeper’s (1991) terminology, fiscal policy is ‘active’ in the
neighborhood of both (a¯, p¯i) and (a¯, pˆi), because, from (13), ∂a˙ (t) /∂a (t)|(a¯,p¯i),(a¯,pˆi) =
r − Ω′ (a¯) > 0, i.e., government liabilities per se tend to explode, and is ‘passive’ in
the neighborhood of both (aˆ, p¯i) and (aˆ, pˆi), because, from (13), ∂a˙ (t) /∂a (t)|(aˆ,p¯i),(aˆ,pˆi) =
r − Ω′ (aˆ) < 0, i.e., government liabilities per se tend to be stable. 
Consequently, the foregoing steady-state analysis implies that the active monetary,
passive fiscal policy regime, displaying ‘monetary dominance’ in Leeper and Leith’s
(2016) terminology, and the passive monetary, active fiscal policy regime, displaying
‘fiscal dominance’, cannot prevail globally. Beyond the well-known Leeper’s dichotomy
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occurring at the steady states (a¯, p¯i) and (aˆ, pˆi), there must exist—because of nonlinear-
ities in both policies—other two steady states, (a¯, pˆi) and (aˆ, p¯i), locally displaying an
active monetary, active fiscal policy regime and a passive monetary, passive fiscal policy
regime, respectively.
5 Local and Global Dynamics
The purpose of this section is to analyze the local and global equilibrium dynamics that
emerge from our setup. The following propositions establish the main results.
Proposition 2 (Local Analysis.) Suppose that both monetary and fiscal policies are
nonlinear (Φ′,Φ′′,Ω′,Ω′′ > 0). Then, from the equilibrium system (12)-(13), locally (a)
the steady state (a¯, p¯i) is a saddle point, (b) the steady state (aˆ, p¯i) is a sink, (c) the steady
state (a¯, pˆi) is a source, and (d) the steady state (aˆ, pˆi) is a saddle point.
Proof. (a) Let J(a¯,p¯i) be the Jacobian of (12)-(13) evaluated at (a¯, p¯i). We have
detJ(a¯,p¯i) =
−(r−Ω′(a¯))L(Φ(p¯i))(Φ′(p¯i)−1)
Φ′(p¯i)L′(Φ(p¯i)) < 0, since Ω
′ (a¯) < r, L′(Φ (p¯i)) < 0, and Φ′ (p¯i) <
1. Therefore, (a¯, p¯i) is a saddle point, with the stable arm given by pi (t) = p¯i +
−L(Φ(p¯i))(Φ′(p¯i)−1)/(Φ′(p¯i)L′(Φ(p¯i)))−(r−Ω′(a¯))
(Φ′(p¯i)−1)a¯ (a (t)− a¯). (b) Let J(aˆ,p¯i) be the Jacobian eval-
uated at (aˆ, p¯i). We have trJ(aˆ,p¯i) = (r − Ω
′ (aˆ)) − L(Φ(p¯i))(Φ
′(p¯i)−1)
Φ′(p¯i)L′(Φ(p¯i)) < 0 and detJ(aˆ,p¯i) =
−(r−Ω′(aˆ))L(Φ(p¯i))(Φ′(p¯i)−1)
Φ′(p¯i)L′(Φ(p¯i)) > 0, for now Ω
′ (aˆ) > r. This implies that (aˆ, p¯i) is a sink.
(c) Let J(a¯,pˆi) be the Jacobian evaluated at (a¯, pˆi). We have trJ(a¯,pˆi) = (r −Ω
′ (a¯)) −
L(Φ(pˆi))(Φ′(pˆi)−1)
Φ′(pˆi)L′(Φ(pˆi)) > 0 and detJ(a¯,pˆi) =
−(r−Ω′(a¯))L(Φ(pˆi))(Φ′(pˆi)−1)
Φ′(pˆi)L′(Φ(pˆi)) > 0, since Ω
′ (a¯) < r,
L′(Φ (pˆi)) < 0, and Φ′ (pˆi) > 1. Therefore, (a¯, pˆi) is a source. (d) Let J(aˆ,pˆi) be the Ja-
cobian evaluated at (aˆ, pˆi). We have detJ(aˆ,pˆi) =
−(r−Ω′(aˆ))L(Φ(pˆi))(Φ′(pˆi)−1)
Φ′(pˆi)L′(Φ(pˆi)) < 0, for now
Ω′ (aˆ) > r. Thus, (aˆ, pˆi) is a saddle point, with the stable arm given by pi (t) = pˆi. 
Proposition 3 (Global Analysis.) Suppose that both monetary and fiscal policies are
nonlinear (Φ′,Φ′′,Ω′,Ω′′ > 0). Then, from the equilibrium system (12)-(13), globally
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there exist infinite equilibrium paths originating in the neighborhood of the steady states
(a¯, p¯i), (a¯, pˆi) and (aˆ, pˆi), and converging asymptotically to the steady state (aˆ, p¯i); the
saddle manifolds associated with (a¯, p¯i) and (aˆ, pˆi) give rise to three heteroclinic orbits
connecting the four steady states; the two heteroclinic orbits associated to the stable
saddle manifolds are the boundary of the basin of attraction of (aˆ, p¯i).
Proof. Setting p˙i (t) = 0 in equation (12) yields two isoclines given by pi (t) = p¯i and
pi (t) = pˆi. In the phase plane (a (t) , pi (t)), they are horizontal, with pˆi > p¯i. Setting
a˙ (t) = 0 yields Φ(pi (t)) − pi (t) = Ω(a(t))a(t) . We have
dpi(t)
da(t)
∣∣∣
a˙(t)=0
= Ω
′(a(t))−(Ω(a(t))/a(t))
(Φ′(pi(t))−1)a(t) ,
which is positive at (a¯, p¯i) and (aˆ, pˆi), negative at (aˆ, p¯i) and (a¯, pˆi), zero if Ω′ (a (t)) =
Ω (a (t)) /a (t) and tends to infinity as Φ′(pi (t))→ 1. Let pi∗ = argmin
pi(t)
{Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)}
and a∗ = argmin
a(t)
{
Ω(a(t))
a(t)
}
. Therefore, in the phase plane (a (t) , pi (t)), we have: (Case
I) if Φ(pi∗) − pi∗ < Ω(a
∗)
a∗ , there are two isoclines a˙ (t) = 0, one U-shaped, connecting
(a¯, pˆi) and (aˆ, pˆi), the other inverted U-shaped, connecting (a¯, p¯i) and (aˆ, p¯i); (Case II)
if Φ(pi∗) − pi∗ > Ω(a
∗)
a∗ , there are two isoclines a˙ (t) = 0, one U-shaped to the left,
connecting (a¯, p¯i) and (a¯, pˆi), the other U-shaped to the right, connecting (aˆ, p¯i) and
(aˆ, pˆi). From (12), p˙i (t) > 0 if either pi (t) < p¯i or pi (t) > pˆi; p˙i (t) < 0 if p¯i < pi (t) < pˆi.
From (13), a˙ (t) > (<) 0 if Φ(pi (t)) − pi (t) > (<) Ω(a(t))a(t) . Figure 3 shows the global
dynamics for Case I. Figure 4 shows the global dynamics for Case II. In both cases, the
stable arm of the saddle point passing through (a¯, p¯i) has locally a positive slope, given
by −L(Φ(p¯i))(Φ
′(p¯i)−1)/Φ′(p¯i)L′(Φ(p¯i))−(r−Ω′(a¯))
(Φ′(p¯i)−1)a¯ , which is higher than the slope of the isocline
a˙ (t) = 0 evaluated at (a¯, p¯i), given by Ω
′(a¯)−r
(Φ′(p¯i)−1)a¯ . Because the steady state (a¯, pˆi) is a
source, there must exist one trajectory—the heteroclinic orbit Ψ1—originating in the
neighborhood of the steady state (a¯, pˆi) and converging to the steady state (a¯, p¯i). Such
a saddle connection follows a non-monotonous path that must change direction when
a˙ (t) = 0. For the same rationale, there further exists a second heteroclinic orbit, Ψ2,
originating in the neighborhood of the steady state (a¯, pˆi) and converging to the steady
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state (aˆ, pˆi). The saddle connection Ψ2 joining (a¯, pˆi) and (aˆ, pˆi) is given by the isocline
pi = pˆi, which is also the stable arm of the saddle-path stable steady state (aˆ, pˆi). In
addition, because the steady state (aˆ, p¯i) is a sink, there exists a third heteroclinic orbit,
Ψ3, originating in the neighborhood of the steady state (a¯, p¯i) and converging to the
steady state (aˆ, p¯i). In this case, the saddle connection Ψ3 joining (a¯, p¯i) and (aˆ, p¯i) is
given by the isocline pi = p¯i, which is also the unstable arm of the saddle-path exhibited
by the steady state (a¯, p¯i). Hence, in the neighborhood of the steady states (a¯, p¯i), (a¯, pˆi)
and (aˆ, pˆi), for a given initial condition a (0), there exists an infinite number of equilibrium
initial values, for instance pi (0)11, pi (0)12, pi (0)21 and pi (0)22 in Figures 3 and 4, such
that (a (t) , pi (t)) will converge asymptotically to the steady state (aˆ, p¯i). The heteroclinic
orbits Ψ1 and Ψ2 are, as a result, the boundary of the basin of attraction of (aˆ, p¯i). 
6 Discussion of the Results
The literature on monetary-fiscal policy interactions (e.g., Leeper, 1991, Woodford, 2003,
Leeper and Leith, 2016) demonstrates that either an active monetary, passive fiscal
regime or an active fiscal, passive monetary regime ensures equilibrium determinacy. In
Figures 3 and 4, these cases of ‘monetary dominance’ or ‘fiscal dominance’, respectively,
correspond to the existence of two saddle paths associated to the steady states (a¯, p¯i)
and (aˆ, pˆi).
If one focuses on local dynamics around either (a¯, p¯i) or (aˆ, pˆi), for a given initial
condition a (0) 6= a¯, aˆ, there indeed exists a unique value of inflation—in the case of
fiscal dominance given by pi (0)F = p¯i+
−L(Φ(p¯i))(Φ′(p¯i)−1)/Φ′(p¯i)L′(Φ(p¯i))−(r−Ω′(a¯))
(Φ′(p¯i)−1)a¯ (a (0)− a¯)
and in the case of monetary dominance given by pi (0)M = pˆi—such that (a (t) , pi (t)) will
converge to (a¯, p¯i) or (aˆ, pˆi), respectively, as also shown in Figures 3 and 4.
However, (a¯, p¯i) and (aˆ, pˆi) are not unique steady-state equilibria if the monetary
and fiscal policy conduct is nonlinear. Proposition 2 shows that, when the monetary
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and the fiscal regimes are nonlinear, even if the steady state (a¯, p¯i), exhibiting fiscal
dominance, and the steady state (aˆ, pˆi), exhibiting monetary dominance, deliver locally
a unique stable equilibrium, globally there exist infinite equilibrium paths originating
in the neighborhood of (a¯, p¯i), (a¯, pˆi) and (aˆ, pˆi), and converging asymptotically to the
high-debt/low-inflation steady state (aˆ, p¯i).
Inflation no longer needs to stay on a saddle path to guarantee global stability. As it
emerges from Figures 3 and 4, all initial values pi (0) delimitated upwards by the saddle
connections Ψ1 and Ψ2 do constitute equilibrium values that make (a (t) , pi (t)) converge
to (aˆ, p¯i).
As a main consequence, the existence of the basin of attraction featured by debt
increases and disinflation implies that the dynamic system is indeterminate even around
the steady states usually displaying fiscal and monetary dominance. In other words,
under nonlinear interest-rate and primary-surplus adjustments of the type empirically
documented, neither monetary variables nor fiscal variables are viable to ‘pin down’ the
inflation rate.
Given the results obtained, a relevant question that naturally arises at this point
is the following. What can public authorities carry out in order to maintain the econ-
omy close to the desirable equilibria that ensure local stability and uniqueness? We
shall show below that avoiding multiple debt-deflation spirals and, at the same time,
guaranteeing global and local determinacy centered at a steady state that keeps the
desirable features of the regime exhibiting monetary dominance—in particular, equilib-
rium uniqueness around the inflation target—would require a structural change in the
fiscal policy behavior, along the lines suggested by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2002).
Specifically, instead of displaying nonlinear adjustments of the primary budget sur-
pluses to changes in debt according to rule (10), consider the case in which the fiscal
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authority also reacts to inflation according to
s (t) = Ψ(pi (t))a (t) , (14)
where Ψ′ (·) > 0, Ψ(pˆi) > 0 and Ψ(p¯i) < 0. Such a fiscal policy rule prescribes the
implementation of a fiscal stimulus should the economy embark on deflationary patterns.
The law of motion of government liabilities thus becomes
a˙ (t) = (Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)−Ψ(pi (t))) a (t) , (15)
whose solution is
a (t) = e
∫
t
0
[Φ(pi(x))−pi(x)−Ψ(pi(x))]dxa (0) , (16)
hence implying
lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
[Φ(pi(x))−pi(x)]dxa (t) = a (0) lim
t→∞
e−
∫
t
0
Ψ(pi(x))dx. (17)
It follows that the tranversality condition is verified for a constant inflation path pi (t) =
pˆi, but is violated for an inflation path converging to p¯i, because Ψ(p¯i) < 0. In other
words, in this case, off-target debt-deflation paths are ruled out as possible equilibrium
outcomes by means of a ‘Non-Ricardian’ fiscal expansion as inflation starts to decrease.
7 Robustness of the Results
The setup so far analyzed conveys our lines of argument in a direct and transparent way.
In this section, we shall incorporate two relevant extensions in order to address the issue
of result robustness. Specifically, we move from an endowment to a production economy
environment, first maintaining the assumption of flexible prices and second introducing
sticky prices.
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Let us initially extend the flexible-price economy to account for endogenous output.
Production now requires labor, h (t), via the technology y (t) = f (h (t)), where f ′ >
0, f ′′ < 0. The utility function of the representative household-firm unit is given by∫
∞
0 e
−rt [u(c (t) ,m (t))− v (h (t))] dt, where v′, v′′ > 0. Optimality yields (4)-(7) jointly
with
v′ (h (t)) = λ (t) f ′ (h (t)) . (18)
In equilibrium, (4), (5) and (18) imply y (t) = Y (R (t)), with Y ′ = ucmf
′/∆ < 0, and
λ (t) = L (R (t)), with L′ = ucm (v
′′ − λf ′′) /f ′∆ < 0, where ∆ ≡ −f ′
(
uccumm − u
2
cm
)
−
[(v′′ − λf ′′) /f ′] × [ucm (um/uc)− umm] < 0. Hence, one obtains the system (12)-(13)
with analogous properties. The results obtained in Sections 3-5 are, therefore, qualita-
tively unchanged. The only difference is that, in this case, increases in inflation and thus
in the nominal interest rate dampen the level of output via a ‘real balance effect’ a` la
Brock (1974).
Consider next the case of sticky prices. Each household-firm unit j now produces
a differentiated good yj (t) via the production function yj (t) = f
(
hj (t)
)
, and faces
a demand function of the form yd (t) d
(
P j (t) /P (t)
)
, where yd (t) indicates aggregate
demand, P j (t) the product j’s price, P (t) the price level, and d (·) obeys d′ < 0, d (1) = 1
and d′ (1) = −1. Consistently with Rotemberg (1982), the lifetime utility is of the form
∫
∞
0
e−rt

u(cj (t) ,mj (t))− v (hj (t))− ρ
2
(
P˙ j (t)
P j (t)
− pˆi
)2 dt, (19)
where ρ is a positive parameter. The budget constraint in real terms is now
a˙j (t) = (R (t)− pi (t)) aj (t)−R (t)mj (t) +
P j (t)
P (t)
f
(
hj (t)
)
− cj (t)− τ (t) . (20)
Let δj (t) be the multiplier associated with the constraint that output is demand-
determined, f
(
hj (t)
)
= yd (t) d
(
P j (t) /P (t)
)
, and set p˙ij (t) ≡ P˙ j (t) /P j (t). Opti-
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mality yields conditions (4)-(7) indexed by j and
v′
(
hj (t)
)
=
[
λj (t)
P j (t)
P (t)
− δj (t)
]
f ′
(
hj (t)
)
, (21)
p˙ij (t) = r
(
pij (t)− pˆi
)
−
1
ρ
[
λj (t)
P j (t)
P (t)
f
(
hj (t)
)
+ δj (t)
P j (t)
P (t)
yd (t) d′
(
P j (t)
P (t)
)]
.
(22)
In the symmetric equilibrium, equations (4)-(5) imply y (t) = Y (λ (t) , R (t)), with Yλ =
− [ucm (um/uc)− umm] /
(
uccumm − u
2
cm
)
< 0 and YR = −λ/
(
uccumm − u
2
cm
)
< 0. In
this case, we thus obtain the system
λ˙ (t) = −λ (t) [Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)− r] , (23)
p˙i (t) = r (pi (t)− pˆi)−
λ (t)Y (λ (t) ,Φ (pi (t)))
ρ
×
[
1 + ε−
εv′
(
f−1 (Y (λ (t) ,Φ (pi (t))))
)
λ (t) f ′ (f−1 (Y (λ (t) ,Φ (pi (t)))))
]
, (24)
a˙ (t) = (Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)) a (t)−Ω(a (t)), (25)
where ε ≡ d′ (1) < −1. Let λˆ and λ¯ be the steady-state levels of λ associated with pˆi
and p¯i, respectively, and, from (24), uniquely satisfying8
1 + ε
ε
λˆ =
v′
(
f−1
(
Y
(
λˆ,Φ (pˆi)
)))
f ′
(
f−1
(
Y
(
λˆ,Φ (pˆi)
))) , (26)
1 + ε
ε
λ¯ =
v′
(
f−1
(
Y
(
λ¯,Φ (p¯i)
)))
f ′
(
f−1
(
Y
(
λ¯,Φ (p¯i)
))) − ρr (pˆi − p¯i)
εY
(
λ¯,Φ (p¯i)
) . (27)
Then, the next propositions apply.
Proposition 4 (Local Analysis with Sticky Prices.) Suppose that both monetary and
fiscal policies are nonlinear (Φ′,Φ′′,Ω′,Ω′′ > 0). Then, from the equilibrium system
(23)-(25), locally (a) the steady state
(
λ¯,p¯i, a¯
)
is a saddle point with a one-dimensional
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stable space, (b) the steady state
(
λ¯, p¯i, aˆ
)
is a saddle point with a two-dimensional stable
space, (c) the steady state
(
λˆ,pˆi, a¯
)
is a source, and (d) the steady state
(
λˆ, pˆi, aˆ
)
is a
saddle point with a one-dimensional stable space.
Proof. The Jacobian of (23)-(25) is block-diagonal. One eigenvalue is r − Ω′ and the
remaining two eigenvalues are obtained from the sub-matrix
K =

 0 −λ (Φ′ − 1)
k21 k22

 , (28)
where k21 =
εy
ρf ′
[(
v′′ − v
′f ′′
f ′
)
Yλ
f ′ −
v′
λ
]
> 0 and k22 = r +
εy
ρ(f ′)2
(
v′′ − v
′f
′′
f ′
)
YRΦ
′ >
0. Since detK = k21λ (Φ
′ − 1) ⋚ 0 if Φ′ ⋚ 1, trK = k22 > 0, the steady states(
λ¯,p¯i, a¯
)
and
(
λ¯,p¯i, aˆ
)
are saddle points with one- and two-dimensional stable spaces,
respectively. Let µ1 be the negative eigenvalue associated to (28). Then, the saddle-
path solution around the
(
λ¯,p¯i, a¯
)
yields λ (t) = λ¯ − λ¯(Φ
′(p¯i)−1)
µ
1
(pi (t)− p¯i) and pi (t) =
p¯i+ µ1−[r−Ω
′(a¯)]
(Φ′(p¯i)−1)a∗
1
(a (t)− a¯), where a (t) = a¯+ (a (0)− a¯) eµ1t. The steady states
(
λˆ,pˆi, a¯
)
and
(
λˆ, pˆi, aˆ
)
are a source and a saddle point with a one-dimensional stable space,
respectively. The saddle-path solution around
(
λˆ, pˆi, aˆ
)
is given by λ (t) = λˆ, pi (t) = pˆi,
and a (t) = aˆ+ (a (0)− aˆ) e[r−Ω
′(aˆ)]t. 
Proposition 5 (Global Analysis with Sticky Prices.) Suppose that both monetary and
fiscal policies are nonlinear (Φ′,Φ′′,Ω′,Ω′′ > 0). Then, from the equilibrium system
(23)-(25), globally there exist infinite equilibrium paths originating in the neighborhood
of the steady states
(
λ¯, p¯i, a¯
)
,
(
λˆ, pˆi, a¯
)
and
(
λˆ, pˆi, aˆ
)
, and converging asymptotically to the
steady state
(
λ¯, p¯i, aˆ
)
; the saddle manifolds associated to
(
λ¯, p¯i, a¯
)
and
(
λˆ, pˆi, aˆ
)
give rise
to three types of heteroclinic orbits connecting the four steady states; the two heteroclinic
orbits associated to the stable saddle manifolds are the boundary of the basin of attraction
of
(
λ¯, p¯i, aˆ
)
.
Proof. From (25), da˙(t)dpi(t) = (Φ
′ − 1) a (t) ⋚ 0 if Φ′ ⋚ 1. This implies that, in the
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neighborhood of
(
λ¯, p¯i, a¯
)
, for a given initial condition a (0), there exists an infinite
number of equilibrium initial values pi (0) < pi (0)F = p¯i +
µ1−[r−Ω
′(a¯)]
(Φ′(p¯i)−1)a¯ (a (0)− a¯), such
that (λ (t) , pi (t) , a (t)) will converge asymptotically to
(
λ¯, p¯i, aˆ
)
along the saddle path
associated with the submatrix (28), given by λ (t) = λ¯ − λ¯(Φ
′(p¯i)−1)
µ1
(pi (t)− p¯i) around
both
(
λ¯, p¯i, a¯
)
and
(
λ¯, p¯i, aˆ
)
. The saddle manifold associated with
(
λ¯, p¯i, a¯
)
is thus the
boundary of the basin of attraction of
(
λ¯, p¯i, aˆ
)
. Since da˙(t)da(t)
∣∣∣
(λ¯,p¯i)
= r − Ω′ (a (t)) is
positive at a¯ and negative at aˆ, there exists a second type of heteroclinic orbit joining
the two steady states
(
λ¯, p¯i, a¯
)
and
(
λ¯, p¯i, aˆ
)
, along λ (t) = λ¯ and pi (t) = p¯i, which are
also the stable arms of the saddle point
(
λ¯, p¯i, aˆ
)
. Since, finally,
(
λˆ,pˆi, a¯
)
is a source and(
λˆ, pˆi, aˆ
)
is a saddle point with a one-dimensional stable space, there exists a third type
of heteroclinic orbit joining the two steady states
(
λˆ, pˆi, a¯
)
and
(
λˆ, pˆi, aˆ
)
, along λ (t) = λˆ
and pi (t) = pˆi, which are also the stable arms of the saddle point
(
λˆ, pˆi, aˆ
)
. As a result,
there exist infinite equilibrium paths originating in the neighborhood of both
(
λˆ, pˆi, a¯
)
and
(
λˆ, pˆi, aˆ
)
, and converging asymptotically to the steady state
(
λ¯, p¯i, aˆ
)
. 
Hence, from Propositions 4-5, the presence of price stickiness in the framework and
the implied sluggish adjustments associated with the presence of a Phillips curve do not
alter in any essential dimension the root of the main results obtained in the baseline
model with flexible prices.
8 Conclusions
The issue of interaction between monetary and fiscal policies is a central topic in macroe-
conomic theory, but is largely uninvestigated when both policies are nonlinear, as sup-
ported by much empirical evidence.
The present paper has three main conclusions. First, nonlinear monetary policy, in
which the nominal interest rate displays an increasing marginal response to inflation,
interacting with nonlinear fiscal policy, in which the primary surplus displays an in-
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creasing marginal response to debt, generates four steady-state equilibria. In particular,
each steady state features in its neighborhood a pair of ‘active’/‘passive’ monetary/fiscal
policies a` la Leeper-Woodford.
Second, the steady states are endogenously connected. In particular, the dynamic
analysis shows the existence of infinite self-fulfilling paths that originate around the
steady states locally displaying either monetary or fiscal dominance, hence locally sus-
taining equilibrium determinacy, but that globally converge into an unintended high-
debt/low-inflation (possibly deflation) trap.
Third, and relatedly, high debt-deflation traps a` la Fisher can naturally occur be-
cause of the interaction of nonlinear monetary-fiscal policy behavior, without recourse
to more complicated derivations. Such global trajectories are, nevertheless, overlooked
if the four monetary-fiscal policy mixes are investigated locally and separately. This
paper shows that globally there exist heteroclinic orbits, i.e., saddle connections among
steady states—arising from the saddle paths in which inflation is typically pinned down
by monetary or fiscal variables within standard linear formulations of monetary-fiscal
interrelationships—which, in the present context, constitute the boundary of the basin
of attraction.
To keep the theoretical investigation compact and convey our line of argument in
a transparent way—directly comparable with Leeper’s seminal work—we have first ab-
stracted from the presence of price stickiness. Under sticky prices, however, we have
shown that the implied sluggish adjustments associated with the presence of a Phillips
curve do not affect the essence of the analysis in any fundamental dimension.
The analytical results presented in this paper, in conclusion, imply that accounting
for the observed occurrence for nonlinearities in both central bank and government ac-
tions is essential for a comprehensive characterization of the issue of equilibrium dynam-
ics under monetary and fiscal feedback policy rules. Possible extensions of the present
setup aimed to internalize, for example, distortionary taxation, the maturity structure
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of government debt, sovereign risk, and/or agents’ learning, may be the focus of further
research. The simplified framework we have presented could then be employed as an
useful benchmark for more complex analysis along these lines.
Notes
1As the discussion of the related literature in the following section shall point out, the body of
studies empirically supporting the scope for nonlinear feedback interest rate policy rules is large.
It includes, for instance, Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2000, 2005), Dolado, Maria-Dolores
and Ruge-Murcia (2004), Martin and Milas (2004), Taylor and Davradakis (2006), Petersen
(2007), Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008), Hayat and Mishra (2010), Castro (2011), Klose (2011),
Miles and Schreyer (2012, 2014), Lee and Son (2013), Kulikauskas (2014), Naraidoo and Paya
(2014), Neuenkirch and Tillmann (2014), Sznajderska (2014), Ma (2016), and Shen, Lin and Guo
(2016).
2The empirical research detecting nonlinear fiscal adjustments is also extensive. It includes,
for example, Bohn (1998), Sarno (2001), Arestis, Cipollini and Fattouh (2004), Bajo-Rubio,
Diaz-Roldan and Esteve (2004, 2006), Arghyrou and Luintel (2007), Chortareas, Kapetanios
and Uctum (2008), Considine and Gallagher (2008), Cipollini, Fattouh and Mouratidis (2009),
Legrenzi and Milas (2012a, 2012b, 2013), Arghyrou and Fan (2013), and Piergallini and Postigli-
ola (2013).
3Piergallini (2016) shows that a fiscal policy displaying convex nonlinearity in the surplus-
debt relationship is an independent source of multiplicity of steady-state equilibria. To establish
this result, he assumes a conventional linear Taylor rule. By contrast, in this paper we attempt
to analyze the dynamic effects of a nonlinear behavior in fiscal policy conduct interacting with
a nonlinear behavior in monetary policy conduct.
4Fiscal policy is ‘passive’ (‘active’) in Leeper’s (1991) sense when the primary budget surplus
set by the government brings about local stability (instability) of government liabilities for all
stable paths of the other endogenous variables—such as inflation and output—in the neighbor-
hood of a steady state. Monetary policy is ‘active’ (‘passive’) in Leeper’s (1991) sense when the
nominal interest rate set by the central bank increases by more (less) than one-for-one with re-
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spect to an increase in the inflation rate, thereby verifying (violating) the Taylor (1993) principle
(Woodford, 2003). See Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2011), and Leeper and Leith (2016) for
comprehensive analyses and literature reviews on the interactions between monetary and fiscal
policies.
5This assumption is meant to guarantee that, at the steady states, real money demand is
bounded, as in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001).
6For simplicity and without loss of generality, we set public consumption equal to zero.
7This assumption is meant to ensure that, at the steady states, government liabilities are
strictly positive.
8From (27), uniqueness of λ¯ holds under standard functional forms for preferences and tech-
nology. See Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001).
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Figure 1: Multiple steady states under a nonlinear monetary regime
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Figure 3: Dynamic behavior of (a (t) , pi (t)) with nonlinear monetary and fiscal regimes
for Case I: Φ(pi∗) − pi∗ < Ω(a
∗)
a∗ , where pi
∗ = argmin
pi(t)
{Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)} and a∗ =
argmin
a(t)
{
Ω(a(t))
a(t)
}
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Figure 4: Dynamic behavior of (a (t) , pi (t)) with nonlinear monetary and fiscal regimes
for Case II: Φ(pi∗) − pi∗ > Ω(a
∗)
a∗ , where pi
∗ = argmin
pi(t)
{Φ(pi (t))− pi (t)} and a∗ =
argmin
a(t)
{
Ω(a(t))
a(t)
}
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